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Abstract—Advances of machine learning and hardware get-
ting cheaper resulted in smart cameras equipped with facial
recognition becoming unprecedentedly widespread worldwide.
Undeniably, this has a great potential for a wide spectrum of
uses, it also bears novel risks. In our work, we consider a specific
related risk, one related to face embeddings, which are machine
learning created metric values describing the face of a person.
While embeddings seems arbitrary numbers to the naked eye
and are hard to interpret for humans, we argue that some basic
demographic attributes can be estimated from them and these
values can be then used to look up the original person on social
networking sites. We propose an approach for creating synthetic,
life-like datasets consisting of embeddings and demographic data
of several people. We show over these ground truth datasets
that the aforementioned re-identifications attacks do not require
expert skills in machine learning in order to be executed. In
our experiments, we find that even with simple machine learning
models the proportion of successfully re-identified people vary
between 6.04% and 28.90%, depending on the population size of
the simulation.
Index Terms—facial recognition, de-anonymization, machine
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in times when efficient uses of artificial intelligence
and cheap smart technology are exploding. By the spread of
smart cameras, applications on facial recognition had become
almost ubiquitous in some cities around the world. In some
cases we can find the driver reason for this in the security
concerns of the public, but face recognition (or FR in short)
can be applied to a much broader set of use-cases. Beside
identification or authentication of individuals in crowds, it
could benefit the society also in criminal detection, searching
for lost people, customer behavior analysis, etc. [1].
However, FR technology could be abused and therefore it
has the potential to pose risks to individuals, to the society
and even to the governmental and business sectors, as well [2].
This puts related ethical issues into the focus. The French data
protection authority, the CNIL (French National Commission
on Informatics and Liberty) published a recent paper detailing
the technical, legal and ethical challenges regarding these
applications [3]. The biggest concern probably is how FR
is being a part of emerging surveillance technologies [4].
Consequently, several governments made recent attempts in
order to regulate the uses of FR technology.
Despite official guidelines for camera surveillance [5], some
believe that automated FR breaches GDPR because it fails to
meet the requirement for consent by design [6]. The European
Commission even considered imposing a temporary ban on
using FR in public spaces, which was later discarded [7].
In their white paper released on the 19th February [8], the
European Commission rather envisions an approach where
companies evaluate their own data processing practices from
a risk-based point of view. This is backed up by a recent
proposal to conduct an impact assessment analysis when
dealing with FR applications [2].
This debate on the ban is also present in the US. While
Washington DC just passed facial recognition rules that al-
low the use of the technology with some restrictions (e.g.
government agencies can only use FR software if it’s got an
application programming interface, and vendors must reveal
any reports of bias) [9], San Francisco was the first city to
ban FR entirely in public spaces [10]. The unresolved nature
of these issues is further confirmed by the Fundamental Rights
Agency, who released a paper about the fundamental rights
considerations regarding FR [11].
Certain related risks can be associated with the processing
and storing of facial imprints. State-of-the-art face imprints are
coming from the domain of Deep Metric Learning (DML), in
which deep learning techniques are trained to produce descrip-
tive vectors of faces while also considering their similarity
[12]. These vectors, or face embeddings, have high similarity
when taken from the same person, but have a low similarity
score when taken from different people. While these seem
as a list of arbitrary numbers to the naked eye, they may
contain personal information about the person whose photo
was taken. In their recent work, Mai et al. showed that the
photo itself can be reconstructible from the embedding [13].
In [14] authors argue that it should be an accepted fact that
with good accuracy the original sample can be reconstructed
from unprotected embeddings. This means that sensitive data
could be derived from unprotected templates and other attacks
can also be launched based on the reconstruction results. Based
on this, it can also be possible to reverse engineer data from
face embeddings in order to find out the original identity of
the embedding.
In this paper we examine an attack that aims to find out
the original identity of face imprints. As the original faces
can be partially rebuilt from embeddings, we look at the
scenario where the attacker tries to reconstruct demographic
data from the embeddings. First, we measure the level of
accuracy achievable in predicting age, sex and race from
facial embeddings, then we create a synthetic dataset and
run the attack from one end to the other. Our results show
that predicting these characteristics is indeed possible with
alarming accuracy and re-identification attacks can be executed
successfully.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we discuss
how facial recognition works, the privacy risks of processing
face embeddings and how re-identification attacks work. Next,
in Section III, we introduce our attacker model. In Section
IV we describe how we used different technologies in our
research, and following in Sections V-VI we elaborate our
results. Finally, Section VII summarizes our work.
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II. RELATED WORK
A. Facial Recognition
The main motivation behind facial recognition is to make it
possible to identify people, e.g. a person from a digital photo
or video frame based on the face’s unique characteristics.
Despite the fact that it has only become widespread in recent
years, the technology has been around for decades, although it
wasn’t as extensively used as today, because it had many open
problems that hindered its performance and accuracy, like the
lack of enough computational power and training data, which
resulted in poor scalability.
However, the first milestone towards automated FR came
in 1988 when Sirovich and Kirby came up with the Eigen-
face approach [15], which applies linear algebra (including
principal component analysis) to recognize faces. Basically,
it works by creating an average face and multiple so called
Eigenfaces based on all faces available in a dataset, and
then representing each new face as a vector made up of the
coefficients of the linear combination of the average face and
the Eigenfaces. Then the similarity between two faces depends
on the distance metric between each face’s vector, with a
small distance corresponding to higher similarity. In 1991,
Turk and Pentland further improved the Eigenface approach to
also detect faces in images [16]. Since then, it was in the 2010s
when FR technology significantly improved due to the usage
of machine learning and deep neural networks. This was made
possible by the large amount of training data and computing
power available.
In our analysis we wanted to work with state-of-the-art
facial recognition techniques that are publicly available in
Python libraries and that could be run efficiently on a typical
smart camera. One of the leading solutions is found in the
dlib library [17], which uses the ResNet-34 structure deep
neural network from [18], trained on the Labeled Faces in
the Wild dataset (LFW) [19]. Another prominent method is
implemented in the OpenCV library. This deep convolutional
network uses the FaceNet structure [20] that directly maps
face images into the Euclidean space using a triplet-based loss
function based on large margin nearest neighbor classification
(LMNN) [21]. This library achieves a 99.63% accuracy score
on the LFW dataset [19].
Both of these techniques produce a 128 long vector of
float values. When comparing the two methods, we found
that the technique offered by dlib provides a better trade-
off regarding less false positives, with a slightly higher rate
of false negatives. Therefore we decided to work with it
throughout our experiments.
B. Risks Related to Embeddings
Face embeddings should be considered biometric data by
definition provided by the General Data Protection Regulation
(Art 4. §14 in [22]): an embedding consists of data points
that were extracted from the photo of a person that allow
or enable the identification of the data subject. Due to their
nature, biometric attributes capture features of the human body
that one cannot be changed. Therefore, significant societal
and privacy risks arise, which urges the need to analyze the
impacts of this technology [2]. As we discussed previously,
modern FR works by extracting templates from photos that
need to be stored in a database or compared previously stored
ones. If we consider the number of people represented in
the images X, and the number of people who are part of
a database Y, then FR can be used for authentication (X:1
Y:1), identification (X:1 Y:n) or tracking (X:1 Y: no need for
a database). Depending on these various use cases, the risks
can be more or less severe, e.g., a big central database means
higher risks against malicious actors than a smaller database.
Further reasons for concern are that FR is not a perfect
technology, risk appear that had been seen previously in
automated decision making systems [23]. For example, FR can
be discriminatory due to biases built into the technology, or
one may find it difficult to explain in details how DML-based
facial recognition works or why it had proposed a specific
embedding in a certain situation.
Authors in [24] mention two potential threats regarding an
attacker’s abilities. One of the hazards is to masquerade the
template owner, which means using the biometric template for
reconstructing a 2D or 3D model of the template owner’s face
and using that model to trick a FR system. The other is the
possibility of the attacker to do cross matching between multi-
ple databases storing biometric templates, because biometrics
are mostly immutable and the same or very similar templates
could be stored in multiple databases for different applications.
These risks motivate the use of biometric template protection
(BTP) schemes that transform biometric templates to make
their usage and storage safe, while also keeping their utility.
III. RISK AND ATTACKER MODEL
In our work, we consider re-identification attacks against a
database of face embeddings. Since face embeddings are based
on the face’s unique characteristics and enable reconstructing
faces, they may contain hints for demographic information as
well. This can contribute to identification attacks.
Re-identification attacks are when an attacker combines
multiple data sources to uncover the identities in the anony-
mous dataset. A common example is a health care provider
who publishes data for research purposes after removing
any PII (personally identifiable information) such as names,
addresses, social security numbers, etc. However, as [25]
showed, it can still be possible to re-identify people in that
database by linking it with an additional database (e.g. publicly
available voter database). Demographic data can be especially
vulnerable against re-identification attacks, as [25] showed that
the zip code, sex and date of birth provides a unique identifier
for 87% of the US population based on census data.
These examples showed that tabular datasets are vulnerable
for re-identification. It has been shown that large datasets,
where the number of attributes is rather proportional to the
number of rows, can also be re-identified. Various examples
include movie ratings [26], social networks [27], and credit
card usage patterns [28]. As explained later, here we consider
rebuilding attributes from embeddings that we consider later
for re-identification.
In our case, let us consider the following FR system setup
that may be deployed at a company, and the corresponding
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that one cannot be changed. Therefore, significant societal
and privacy risks arise, which urges the need to analyze the
impacts of this technology [2]. As we discussed previously,
modern FR works by extracting templates from photos that
need to be stored in a database or compared previously stored
ones. If we consider the number of people represented in
the images X, and the number of people who are part of
a database Y, then FR can be used for authentication (X:1
Y:1), identification (X:1 Y:n) or tracking (X:1 Y: no need for
a database). Depending on these various use cases, the risks
can be more or less severe, e.g., a big central database means
higher risks against malicious actors than a smaller database.
Further reasons for concern are that FR is not a perfect
technology, risk appear that had been seen previously in
automated decision making systems [23]. For example, FR can
be discriminatory due to biases built into the technology, or
one may find it difficult to explain in details how DML-based
facial recognition works or why it had proposed a specific
embedding in a certain situation.
Authors in [24] mention two potential threats regarding an
attacker’s abilities. One of the hazards is to masquerade the
template owner, which means using the biometric template for
reconstructing a 2D or 3D model of the template owner’s face
and using that model to trick a FR system. The other is the
possibility of the attacker to do cross matching between multi-
ple databases storing biometric templates, because biometrics
are mostly immutable and the same or very similar templates
could be stored in multiple databases for different applications.
These risks motivate the use of biometric template protection
(BTP) schemes that transform biometric templates to make
their usage and storage safe, while also keeping their utility.
III. RISK AND ATTACKER MODEL
In our work, we consider re-identification attacks against a
database of face embeddings. Since face embeddings are based
on the face’s unique characteristics and enable reconstructing
faces, they may contain hints for demographic information as
well. This can contribute to identification attacks.
Re-identification attacks are when an attacker combines
multiple data sources to uncover the identities in the anony-
mous dataset. A common example is a health care provider
who publishes data for research purposes after removing
any PII (personally identifiable information) such as names,
addresses, social security numbers, etc. However, as [25]
showed, it can still be possible to re-identify people in that
database by linking it with an additional database (e.g. publicly
available voter database). Demographic data can be especially
vulnerable against re-identification attacks, as [25] showed that
the zip code, sex and date of birth provides a unique identifier
for 87% of the US population based on census data.
These examples showed that tabular datasets are vulnerable
for re-identification. It has been shown that large datasets,
where the number of attributes is rather proportional to the
number of rows, can also be re-identified. Various examples
include movie ratings [26], social networks [27], and credit
card usage patterns [28]. As explained later, here we consider
rebuilding attributes from embeddings that we consider later
for re-identification.
In our case, let us consider the following FR system setup
that may be deployed at a company, and the corresponding
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Abstract—Advances of machine learning and hardware get-
ting cheaper resulted in smart cameras equipped with facial
recognition becoming unprecedentedly widespread worldwide.
Undeniably, this has a great potential for a wide spectrum of
uses, it also bears novel risks. In our work, we consider a specific
related risk, one related to face embeddings, which are machine
learning created metric values describing the face of a person.
While embeddings seems arbitrary numbers to the naked eye
and are hard to interpret for humans, we argue that some basic
demographic attributes can be estimated from them and these
values can be then used to look up the original person on social
networking sites. We propose an approach for creating synthetic,
life-like datasets consisting of embeddings and demographic data
of several people. We show over these ground truth datasets
that the aforementioned re-identifications attacks do not require
expert skills in machine learning in order to be executed. In
our experiments, we find that even with simple machine learning
models the proportion of successfully re-identified people vary
between 6.04% and 28.90%, depending on the population size of
the simulation.
Index Terms—facial recognition, de-anonymization, machine
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in times when efficient uses of artificial intelligence
and cheap smart technology are exploding. By the spread of
smart cameras, applications on facial recognition had become
almost ubiquitous in some cities around the world. In some
cases we can find the driver reason for this in the security
concerns of the public, but face recognition (or FR in short)
can be applied to a much broader set of use-cases. Beside
identification or authentication of individuals in crowds, it
could benefit the society also in criminal detection, searching
for lost people, customer behavior analysis, etc. [1].
However, FR technology could be abused and therefore it
has the potential to pose risks to individuals, to the society
and even to the governmental and business sectors, as well [2].
This puts related ethical issues into the focus. The French data
protection authority, the CNIL (French National Commission
on Informatics and Liberty) published a recent paper detailing
the technical, legal and ethical challenges regarding these
applications [3]. The biggest concern probably is how FR
is being a part of emerging surveillance technologies [4].
Consequently, several governments made recent attempts in
order to regulate the uses of FR technology.
Despite official guidelines for camera surveillance [5], some
believe that automated FR breaches GDPR because it fails to
meet the requirement for consent by design [6]. The European
Commission even considered imposing a temporary ban on
using FR in public spaces, which was later discarded [7].
In their white paper released on the 19th February [8], the
European Commission rather envisions an approach where
companies evaluate their own data processing practices from
a risk-based point of view. This is backed up by a recent
proposal to conduct an impact assessment analysis when
dealing with FR applications [2].
This debate on the ban is also present in the US. While
Washington DC just passed facial recognition rules that al-
low the use of the technology with some restrictions (e.g.
government agencies can only use FR software if it’s got an
application programming interface, and vendors must reveal
any reports of bias) [9], San Francisco was the first city to
ban FR entirely in public spaces [10]. The unresolved nature
of these issues is further confirmed by the Fundamental Rights
Agency, who released a paper about the fundamental rights
considerations regarding FR [11].
Certain related risks can be associated with the processing
and storing of facial imprints. State-of-the-art face imprints are
coming from the domain of Deep Metric Learning (DML), in
which deep learning techniques are trained to produce descrip-
tive vectors of faces while also considering their similarity
[12]. These vectors, or face embeddings, have high similarity
when taken from the same person, but have a low similarity
score when taken from different people. While these seem
as a list of arbitrary numbers to the naked eye, they may
contain personal information about the person whose photo
was taken. In their recent work, Mai et al. showed that the
photo itself can be reconstructible from the embedding [13].
In [14] authors argue that it should be an accepted fact that
with good accuracy the original sample can be reconstructed
from unprotected embeddings. This means that sensitive data
could be derived from unprotected templates and other attacks
can also be launched based on the reconstruction results. Based
on this, it can also be possible to reverse engineer data from
face embeddings in order to find out the original identity of
the embedding.
In this paper we examine an attack that aims to find out
the original identity of face imprints. As the original faces
can be partially rebuilt from embeddings, we look at the
scenario where the attacker tries to reconstruct demographic
data from the embeddings. First, we measure the level of
accuracy achievable in predicting age, sex and race from
facial embeddings, then we create a synthetic dataset and
run the attack from one end to the other. Our results show
that predicting these characteristics is indeed possible with
alarming accuracy and re-identification attacks can be executed
successfully.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we discuss
how facial recognition works, the privacy risks of processing
face embeddings and how re-identification attacks work. Next,
in Section III, we introduce our attacker model. In Section
IV we describe how we used different technologies in our
research, and following in Sections V-VI we elaborate our
results. Finally, Section VII summarizes our work.
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score when taken from different people. While these seem
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A. Facial Recognition
The main motivation behind facial recognition is to make it
possible to iden fy peopl , e.g. person from a digital photo
or video frame based on the face’s unique characteristics.
Despit the fact th t it has only become wid spread in recent
years, the technology has been around for decades, although i
wasn’t as exte sivel used as today, because it had many open
problem that hindered its performance and accuracy, like the
lack of enough computational power and training data, which
resulted in poor scalability.
However, the first milestone towards automated FR came
in 1988 when Sirovich and Kirby came p with the Eigen-
face approach [15], which applies linear algebra (including
principal component analysis) to recognize faces. Basically,
it works by creating average face a d multiple so cal ed
Eigenfaces based on all faces available in a dataset, an
then representing each new face as a vector ma e up of the
coefficient of the linear combination of the average face and
the Eig faces. Then the similarity between two f ces depends
on the distance metric between each face’s vector, with a
small distance corresponding to hig er similarity. In 1991,
Turk and Pentland further improved the Eigenface approach to
also detect faces in images [16]. Since then, it was in the 2010s
when FR technology significantly improved due to usage
of machine learnin and deep eural networks. This was m d
possible by the lar e amount of trai ing data and computing
wer availabl .
In our ana ysis we wanted to work with state-of-the-art
facial recognition techniques that are publicly availabl in
Python libraries and t at could be run efficiently on a typical
smart camera. One of the leading solutions is f und in the
dlib library [17], which uses the ResNet-34 structure deep
neural network from [18], trained on the Labeled Faces in
the Wild dataset (LFW) [19]. Another promin nt method is
implemented in the OpenCV library. This deep convolutional
network uses the FaceNet structure [20] that directly maps
face images into the Euclidean spac using a triplet-based los
unction based n large margin nearest neighbor classification
(LMNN) [21]. This library achieves a 99.63% ac uracy score
on the LFW dataset [19].
Both of these techniques produce a 128 long vector of
float values. When comparing the two methods, w found
that the t chnique offered by dlib pr vid s a better trade-
off regarding less false positives, with a slightly higher rate
false ne atives. Therefore we decided to work with it
throughout our experiments.
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Face embeddings should be considered biometric data by
definition provided by the General Data Protection Regul tion
(Art 4. §14 in [22]): an emb dding consists of data points
that were extracted from the photo of a person th t allow
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a database). Depending on these various use cases, the risks
can be more or l ss severe, e.g., a big central d tabase mean
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Further re sons for concern are that FR is not a perfect
technology, risk appear that h d been seen previously in
automated decision making systems [23]. For example, FR ca
be discriminatory due to biases built into th technology, or
one may find it difficul to explain in details how DML-based
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Authors in [24] me tion tw potential threats regarding an
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their usage and storage sa e, while also keeping their utility.
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ous dataset. A common example is a health care provider
who publishes data for r search purpos s after removing
any PII (personally identifiable information) such as names,
ddresses, social security numbers, etc. However, as [25]
showed, it can still be possible to re-identify people in that
database by li king it with an additional atabase (e.g. publicly
availabl voter database). Demographic can be es ecial
vulnerable against re-identification atta ks, s [25] show d that
the zip code, sex and ate of birth provides a unique id ntifier
for 87% of the US population based on cens s data.
These examples sh wed that t bular datasets are vulnerable
for r -id ntification. It has been shown tha l rge datasets,
whe th number of attribut s is rather proportional o the
number of rows, can also e re- dentified. Various examples
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for re-identification.
In our case, let us consider the following FR system setup
that may be deployed at a company, and the corresponding
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Fig. 1. The considered attack when a malicious third party reconstructs demographic data from embeddings and re-identifies data subjects by linking with
another public database.
attacker model (see Figure 1). Smart cameras observe the
company’s various areas and extract the face embedding of
employees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automation, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by stealing or an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
demographic information (age, sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm created for this task (Step 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can get, and how accurately they can predict demographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equivalence class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence class is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using open source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare two embeddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being the
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hyper parameter tuning and can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based learning algorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on randomly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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II. RELATED WORK
A. Facial Recognition
The main motivation behind facial recognition is to make it
possible to identify people, e.g. a person from a digital photo
or video frame based on the face’s unique characteristics.
Despite the fact that it has only become widespread in recent
years, the technology has been around for decades, although it
wasn’t as extensively used as today, because it had many open
problems that hindered its performance and accuracy, like the
lack of enough computational power and training data, which
resulted in poor scalability.
However, the first milestone towards automated FR came
in 1988 when Sirovich and Kirby came up with the Eigen-
face approach [15], which applies linear algebra (including
principal component analysis) to recognize faces. Basically,
it works by creating an average face and multiple so called
Eigenfaces based on all faces available in a dataset, and
then representing each new face as a vector made up of the
coefficients of the linear combination of the average face and
the Eigenfaces. Then the similarity between two faces depends
on the distance metric between each face’s vector, with a
small distance corresponding to higher similarity. In 1991,
Turk and Pentland further improved the Eigenface approach to
also detect faces in images [16]. Since then, it was in the 2010s
when FR technology significantly improved due to the usage
of machine learning and deep neural networks. This was made
possible by the large amount of training data and computing
power available.
In our analysis we wanted to work with state-of-the-art
facial recognition techniques that are publicly available in
Python libraries and that could be run efficiently on a typical
smart camera. One of the leading solutions is found in the
dlib library [17], which uses the ResNet-34 structure deep
neural network from [18], trained on the Labeled Faces in
the Wild dataset (LFW) [19]. Another prominent method is
implemented in the OpenCV library. This deep convolutional
network uses the FaceNet structure [20] that directly maps
face images into the Euclidean space using a triplet-based loss
function based on large margin nearest neighbor classification
(LMNN) [21]. This library achieves a 99.63% accuracy score
on the LFW dataset [19].
Both of these techniques produce a 128 long vector of
float values. When comparing the two methods, we found
that the technique offered by dlib provides a better trade-
off regarding less false positives, with a slightly higher rate
of false negatives. Therefore we decided to work with it
throughout our experiments.
B. Risks Related to Embeddings
Face embeddings should be considered biometric data by
definition provided by the General Data Protection Regulation
(Art 4. §14 in [22]): an embedding consists of data points
that were extracted from the photo of a person that allow
or enable the identification of the data subject. Due to their
nature, biometric attributes capture features of the human body
that one cannot be changed. Therefore, significant societal
and privacy risks arise, which urges the need to analyze the
impacts of this technology [2]. As we discussed previously,
modern FR works by extracting templates from photos that
need to be stored in a database or compared previously stored
ones. If we consider the number of people represented in
the images X, and the number of people who are part of
a database Y, then FR can be used for authentication (X:1
Y:1), identification (X:1 Y:n) or tracking (X:1 Y: no need for
a database). Depending on these various use cases, the risks
can be more or less severe, e.g., a big central database means
higher risks against malicious actors than a smaller database.
Further reasons for concern are that FR is not a perfect
technology, risk appear that had been seen previously in
automated decision making systems [23]. For example, FR can
be discriminatory due to biases built into the technology, or
one may find it difficult to explain in details how DML-based
facial recognition works or why it had proposed a specific
embedding in a certain situation.
Authors in [24] mention two potential threats regarding an
attacker’s abilities. One of the hazards is to masquerade the
template owner, which means using the biometric template for
reconstructing a 2D or 3D model of the template owner’s face
and using that model to trick a FR system. The other is the
possibility of the attacker to do cross matching between multi-
ple databases storing biometric templates, because biometrics
are mostly immutable and the same or very similar templates
could be stored in multiple databases for different applications.
These risks motivate the use of biometric template protection
(BTP) schemes that transform biometric templates to make
their usage and storage safe, while also keeping their utility.
III. RISK AND ATTACKER MODEL
In our work, we consider re-identification attacks against a
database of face embeddings. Since face embeddings are based
on the face’s unique characteristics and enable reconstructing
faces, they may contain hints for demographic information as
well. This can contribute to identification attacks.
Re-identification attacks are when an attacker combines
multiple data sources to uncover the identities in the anony-
mous dataset. A common example is a health care provider
who publishes data for research purposes after removing
any PII (personally identifiable information) such as names,
addresses, social security numbers, etc. However, as [25]
showed, it can still be possible to re-identify people in that
database by linking it with an additional database (e.g. publicly
available voter database). Demographic data can be especially
vulnerable against re-identification attacks, as [25] showed that
the zip code, sex and date of birth provides a unique identifier
for 87% of the US population based on census data.
These examples showed that tabular datasets are vulnerable
for re-identification. It has been shown that large datasets,
where the number of attributes is rather proportional to the
number of rows, can also be re-identified. Various examples
include movie ratings [26], social networks [27], and credit
card usage patterns [28]. As explained later, here we consider
rebuilding attributes from embeddings that we consider later
for re-identification.
In our case, let us c nsider the following FR system setup
that may be deployed at a company, and the corresponding
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Fig. 1. The considered attack when a malicious third party reco structs demographic data from embeddings and re-identifies data subjects by linking with
another public database.
attacker model (see Figure 1). Smart cameras observe the
company’s various areas and extract the face embedding of
employees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automation, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by stealing or an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
demographic information (age, sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm created for this task (Step 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can get, and how accurately they can predict demographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equivalence class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence class is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using open source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare two embeddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being the
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hyper parameter tuning and can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based learning algorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on randomly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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attacker model (see Figure 1). Smart cameras o serve the
company’s various areas and extract th face embedding of
employees appearing in the video fo tage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for lat r use either for tracking, utomatio , id ntification
or other purpos s (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
mbeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by stealing or an
external perso via hackin ) and i fers the data subjects’
demographic inf rmation ( g , sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm cre ted for this task (Step 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be abl to do a
successful re-id ntification attack by c mparing the original
data with another public data source, for xample by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and St p 5 from Figure 1: how many embed ings the att cker
can get, a d how accurately they can predict demographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
ssess the p tential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, nd our m in goal is to isc ver the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate the potential succ ss of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equival nce class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence cl ss is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In database, the more people that are eith r unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
languag , using open source libraries created for working on
data scie ce and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The fa e recognition
library we use was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to det ct faces i images
and/or video frames and extract the face e beddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare t o embeddings and cal ulate the
mathematical distance betwe n them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Eu lidean distan e being the
most popular ”best pra tice” choice for fac recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to d termine whether
the two mbeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two mbeddings, the mor likely
it is that t ey belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
dista ce threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build thre ML models for predicting the age, s x
and rac from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hy r parameter tuning and can e used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based l rning algorithm used
to predict th class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire traini g data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on ra domly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then ggr gating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used TKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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attacker model (see Figu 1). Smart cameras observe th
c mpany’s various areas and extract the face embedding of
employees a pearing in the vid o footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred a d stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automa ion, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by s aling or an
exter al person v a hacking) and infers the d ta subjects’
demographic information (age, sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm cre ted for this task (St p 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
nd Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can g t, and how accurately they can predict d ographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessa y to
ass ss the potential attacker str ngth first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estim e th potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equ valence class
distribution of d mogra hic details. An equivalence class is a
ubset of elements that are equivalen to each other based on
dem graphic char cteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programm ng
anguage, sing open sou ce libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face r cognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dli [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based n de p learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a hum to interpret,
a computer can comp re two emb ddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean o
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being t
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plica ions. Thes metrics can be us d to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same p son or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-lea n
libra y to build hree ML models for predicting the age, sex
and ace from the eddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy o us ML model tha doesn’t requir
hyper param ter tuning and can be use e sily even by non ML
experts. I is a ensemb -tree based lear ing algorithm us
to predict the class of te t objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on he entire trainin data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision t es on randoml sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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attacker model (see Figure 1). S art camera observe the
company’s various are s a d extract the face embedding of
employees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automation, identification
or other purpos s (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (St ps 3-4, e.g. en employe by st aling r an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
demographic information (age, sex nd race) from them using
computer algor thm created for this task (Step 5). With
this n w i formation the attacker m y now be able to do a
successf l r -iden ifi atio by comparing the original
data wit an her public data source, fo xample by looking
up people on a soci l networking sit (Steps 6-7).
The succ ss of such a attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embed i s the att cker
c n get, and how accurately they can predict de ographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimat the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equivalence class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence class is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using op n source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], andas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we use w s face recognition [32], which is a wr pper
built roun dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technol gy based on deep learning to dete t faces in images
and/or video frames and extract th face mbeddings from
t m. While embeddings are hard for a huma to i terpret,
a computer c compar two embed ings and calculate the
mathematical dista ce between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with t e Euclidea istance bei the
most popular ”best ractice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These etrics can be us d to determine whether
the two embe dings belong to the same person or not. The
lowe the distanc betw en two embeddings, the more lik ly
it is that they bel ng t he same p on. Usually, there is a
dist nce threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
W used Random Forest Cla sifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the e bed ing . We chose Random Forest
Cla sifier as it is n easy to use ML model that doesn’t req ire
hyper parameter tuning can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tr e b sed learning lgorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on rand ly sampl d
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly istribu ed), hen aggr gating the votes of the
decision rees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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attacker odel (see Figure 1). S art ca eras observe the
co pany’s various areas and extract the face e bedding of
e ployees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These e -
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, auto ation, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
e beddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en e ployee by stealing or an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
de ographic infor ation (age, sex and race) fro the using
a co puter algorith created for this task (Step 5). ith
this ne infor ation the attacker ay no be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by co paring the original
data ith another public data source, for exa ple by looking
up people on a social net orking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 fro Figure 1: ho any e beddings the attacker
can get, and ho accurately they can predict de ographic
infor ation fro those e beddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our ork, e
assu e a strong attacker ho has access to all the e beddings
stored in the database, and our ain goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding de ographic
data.
I . ETHODOLOGY
In order to esti ate the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset e considered the equivalence class
distribution of de ographic details. n equivalence class is a
subset of ele ents that are equivalent to each other based on
the de ographic characteristics that e are trying to predict.
In a database, the ore people that are either unique or fall in
s all equivalence classes (e.g. at ost 5 e bers), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Te hni al etails
e carried out our analysis in the Python progra ing
language, using open source libraries created for orking on
data science and achine learning ( L) applications ( u Py
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library e used as face recognition [32], hich is a rapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in i ages
and/or video fra es and extract the face e beddings fro
the . hile e beddings are hard for a hu an to interpret,
a co puter can co pare t o e beddings and calculate the
athe atical distance bet een the , such as Euclidean or
anhattan distance, ith the Euclidean distance being the
ost popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These etrics can be used to deter ine hether
the t o e beddings belong to the sa e person or not. The
lo er the distance bet een t o e beddings, the ore likely
it is that they belong to the sa e person. sually, there is a
distance threshold belo hich e consider e beddings to
belong to the sa e person.
e used Rando Forest Classifiers fro the Scikit-learn
library to build three L odels for predicting the age, sex
and race fro the e beddings. e chose a Rando Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use L odel that doesn’t require
hyper para eter tuning and can be used easily even by non L
experts. It is an ense ble-tree based learning algorith used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the rando forest
orks by training ultiple decision trees on rando ly sa pled
subsets of the training set ( hile also having the attributes
rando ly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by ajority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, e used T Face [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos fro both sexes
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attacker model (see Figure 1). Smart cameras observe the
company’s various areas and extract the face embedding of
employees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automation, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by stealing or an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
demographic information (age, sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm created for this task (Step 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can get, and how accurately they can predict d mographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equivalence class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence class is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demog aphic characteristics that we re trying to predic .
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using open source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare two embeddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being the
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hyper parameter tuning and can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based learning algorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on randomly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. Y, APRIL 2020 4
aged between 1 to over 100, from white, black, asian, indian
and other races, where one image per person is included. Due
to the fact that the various age, sex and race classes were not
balanced, we sampled this data source to gain a more balanced
dataset for training and testing (see the following subsection).
B. Ou Methodology
Since the biggest majority of the people in UTKFace
database are under the age of 80 and are either white,
black, asian or indian, we only considered people fitting these
constraints. There was a very low number of examples in
dropped classes which would have led to poor training and
prediction results. However, not all of the remaining classes
were balanced. For example there were 2043 photos of white
males aged between 20 and 40 years, while only 677 Asian
males in the same age range.
So to achieve a relatively balanced training and testing
data set, we had to apply data down sampling until we were
left with 12192 photos, 1524 photos for each of the 8 race-
sex pairs. Yet, the age distribution still was not completely
balanced, as there were 2893 people (23.73%) aged between
1 and 20 years, 5515 (45.23%) aged between 21 and 40 years,
2452 (20.11%) aged between 41 and 60 years, while only 1332
people (10.93%) were aged between 61 and 80 years. While
we accept this as it is rather life-like, this could hinder model
performance. Furthermore, achieving a completely balanced
dataset would have resulted in too few examples to train and
test with.
The following step is to run the face recognition library’s
face encodings function on all the 12192 images, and stor-
ing the face embedding found for each. Since the image
file names contain the necessary information about a per-
son’s demographics (as all the image file names follow the
[age] [gender] [race] [date&time].jpg pattern), the file names
were used to create the training labels for each image.
Equipped with this labeled data set, it is now possible to
use Scikit-learn’s RandomForestClassifier class to train a Ran-
dom Forest Classifier for predicting the age, sex and race
from face embeddings. In all models, we found that using
a Random Forest of 100 trees can achieve the job (i.e. setting
the n estimators parameter to 100). Also, using Scikit-learn
train test split function to split the data set into 80% training
and 20% testing data made it possible to validate our models.
The simplest Random Forest Classifier to train was the one
predicting the sex of people based on their face embeddings
as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
age prediction, expecting the prediction of precise age values
resulted in poor performance. First this may sound surprising,
but it is impossible even for humans to predict a person’s age
with such precision. Thus some intervals needed to be defined
for age prediction. Choosing narrow age ranges (1-10 years)
also resulted in poor prediction accuracy. On the other hand,
choosing a too wide age range (25 years and over) would have
resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
trade-off, we divided people into 4 age groups: 1-20, 21-40,
41-60 and 61-80 years.
The results of our experiment are detailed in the following
section.
V. MEASUREMENTS
As seen in Table I, which represents the sex prediction
model’s confusion matrix on the test data, the model achieved
an accuracy score of 91.8%, and an F1 score of 91.8%.
Looking at the confusion matrix it can be concluded that even
such a simple model can correctly recognize with closely the
same accuracy both males and females. Figure 2 shows the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which achieved
an area under curve (AUC) value of 97.6%.
Table II shows the confusion matrix of the age prediction
model’s performance on the test data. It can be seen that the
age prediction model achieved an overall accuracy score of
77% and a weighted F1 score of 76.3%. As expected, this
model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9%
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% were between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that almost half the people in the dataset were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model makes is predicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
model’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
DEMOGRAPHICS
With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
embeddings against a synthetic database. We carried out attack
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males aged between 20 and 40 years, while only 677 Asian
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left with 12192 photos, 1524 photos for each of the 8 race-
sex pairs. Yet, the age distribution still was not completely
balanced, as there were 2893 people (23.73%) aged between
1 and 20 years, 5515 (45.23%) aged between 21 and 40 years,
2452 (20.11%) aged between 41 and 60 years, while only 1332
people (10.93%) were aged between 61 and 80 years. While
we accept this as it is rather life-like, this could hinder model
performance. Furthermore, achieving a completely balanced
dataset would have resulted in too few examples to train and
test with.
The following step is to run the face recognition library’s
face encodings function on all the 12192 images, and stor-
ing the face embedding found for each. Since the image
file names contain the necessary information about a per-
son’s demographics (as all the image file names follow the
[age] [gender] [race] [date&time].jpg pattern), the file names
were used to create the training labels for each image.
Equipped with this labeled data set, it is now possible to
use Scikit-learn’s RandomForestClassifier class to train a Ran-
dom Forest Classifier for predicting the age, sex and race
from face embeddings. In all models, we found that using
a Random Forest of 100 trees can achieve the job (i.e. setting
the n estimators parameter to 100). Also, using Scikit-learn
train test split function to split the data set into 80% training
and 20% testing data made it possible to validate our models.
The simplest Random Forest Classifier to train was the one
predicting the sex of people based on their face embeddings
as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
age prediction, expecting the prediction of precise age values
resulted in poor performance. First this may sound surprising,
but it is impossible even for humans to predict a person’s age
with such precision. Thus some intervals needed to be defined
for age prediction. Choosing narrow age ranges (1-10 years)
also resulted in poor prediction accuracy. On the other hand,
choosing a too wide age range (25 years and over) would have
resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
trade-off, we divided people into 4 age groups: 1-20, 21-40,
41-60 and 61-80 years.
The results of our experiment are detailed in the following
section.
V. MEASUREMENTS
As seen in Table I, which represents the sex prediction
model’s confusion matrix on the test data, the model achieved
an accuracy score of 91.8%, and an F1 score of 91.8%.
Looking at the confusion matrix it can be concluded that even
such a simple model can correctly recognize with closely the
same accuracy both males and females. Figure 2 shows the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which achieved
an area under curve (AUC) value of 97.6%.
Table II shows the confusion matrix of the age prediction
model’s performance on the test data. It can be seen that the
age prediction model achieved an overall accuracy score of
77% and a weighted F1 score of 76.3%. As expected, this
model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9%
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% were between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that almost half the people in the dataset were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model makes is predicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
model’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
DEMOGRAPHICS
With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
embeddings against a synthetic database. We carried out attack
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aged between 1 to over 100, from white, black, asian, indian
and other races, where one image per person is included. Due
to the fact that the various age, sex and race classes were not
balanced, we sampled this data source to gain a more balanced
dataset for training and testing (see the following subsection).
B. Our Methodology
Since the biggest majority of the people in UTKFace
database are under the age of 80 and are either white,
black, asian or indian, we only considered people fitting these
constraints. There was a very low number of examples in
dropped classes which would have led to poor training and
prediction results. However, not all of the remaining classes
were balanced. For example there were 2043 photos of white
males aged between 20 and 40 years, while only 677 Asian
males in the same age range.
So to achieve a relatively balanced training and testing
data set, we had to apply data down sampling until we were
left with 12192 photos, 1524 photos for each of the 8 race-
sex pairs. Yet, the age distribution still was not completely
balanced, as there were 2893 people (23.73%) aged between
1 and 20 years, 5515 (45.23%) aged between 21 and 40 years,
2452 (20.11%) aged between 41 and 60 years, while only 1332
people (10.93%) were aged between 61 and 80 years. While
we accept this as it is rather life-like, this could hinder model
performance. Furthermore, achieving a completely balanced
dataset would have resulted in too few examples to train and
test with.
The following step is to run the face recognition library’s
face encodings function on all the 12192 images, and stor-
ing the face embedding found for each. Since the image
file names contain the necessary information about a per-
son’s demographics (as all the image file names follow the
[age] [gender] [race] [date&time].jpg pattern), the file names
were used to create the training labels for each image.
Equipped with this labeled data set, it is now possible to
use Scikit-learn’s RandomForestClassifier class to train a Ran-
dom Forest Classifier for predicting the age, sex and race
from face embeddings. In all models, we found that using
a Random Forest of 100 trees can achieve the job (i.e. setting
the n estimators parameter to 100). Also, using Scikit-learn
train test split function to split the data set into 80% training
and 20% testing data made it possible to validate our models.
The simplest Random Forest Classifier to train was the one
predicting the sex of people based on their face embeddings
as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
age prediction, expecting the prediction of precise age values
resulted in poor performance. First this may sound surprising,
but it is impossible even for humans to predict a person’s age
with such precision. Thus some intervals needed to be defined
for age prediction. Choosing narrow age ranges (1-10 years)
also resulted in poor prediction accuracy. On the other hand,
choosing a too wide age range (25 years and over) would have
resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
trade-off, we divided people into 4 age groups: 1-20, 21-40,
41-60 and 61-80 years.
The results of our experiment are detailed in the following
section.
V. MEASUREMENTS
As seen in Table I, which represents the sex prediction
model’s confusion matrix on the test data, the model achieved
an accuracy score of 91.8%, and an F1 score of 91.8%.
Looking at the confusion matrix it can be concluded that even
such a simple model can correctly recognize with closely the
same accuracy both males and females. Figure 2 shows the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which achieved
an area under curve (AUC) value of 97.6%.
Table II shows the confusion matrix of the age prediction
model’s performance on the test data. It can be seen that the
age prediction model achieved an overall accuracy score of
77% and a weighted F1 score of 76.3%. As expected, this
model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9%
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% were between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that almost half the people in the dataset were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model makes is predicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
model’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
DEMOGRAPHICS
With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
embeddings against a synthetic database. We carried out attack
INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. Y, APRIL 2020 4
aged between 1 to over 100, from white, black, asian, indian
and other races, where one image per person is included. Due
to the fact that the various age, sex and race classes were not
balanced, we sampled this data source to gain a more balanced
dataset for training and testing (see the following subsection).
B. Our Methodology
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database are under the age of 80 and are either white,
black, asian or indian, we only considered people fitting these
constraints. There was a very low number of examples in
dropped classes which would have led to poor training and
prediction results. However, not all of the remaining classes
were balanced. For example there were 2043 photos of white
males aged between 20 and 40 years, while only 677 Asian
males in the same age range.
So to achieve a relatively balanced training and testing
data set, we had to apply data down sampling until we were
left with 12192 photos, 1524 photos for each of the 8 race-
sex pairs. Yet, the age distribution still was not completely
balanced, as there were 2893 people (23.73%) aged between
1 and 20 years, 5515 (45.23%) aged between 21 and 40 years,
2452 (20.11%) aged between 41 and 60 years, while only 1332
people (10.93%) were aged between 61 and 80 years. While
we accept this as it is rather life-like, this could hinder model
performance. Furthermore, achieving a completely balanced
dataset would have resulted in too few examples to train and
test with.
The following step is to run the face recognition library’s
face encodings function on all the 12192 images, and stor-
ing the face embedding found for each. Since the image
file names contain the necessary information about a per-
son’s demographics (as all the image file names follow the
[age] [gender] [race] [date&time].jpg pattern), the file names
were used to create the training labels for each image.
Equipped with this labeled data set, it is now possible to
use Scikit-learn’s RandomForestClassifier class to train a Ran-
dom Forest Classifier for predicting the age, sex and race
from face embeddings. In all models, we found that using
a Random Forest of 100 trees can achieve the job (i.e. setting
the n estimators parameter to 100). Also, using Scikit-learn
train test split function to split the data set into 80% training
and 20% testing data made it possible to validate our models.
The simplest Random Forest Classifier to train was the one
predicting the sex of people based on their face embeddings
as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
age prediction, expecting the prediction of precise age values
resulted in poor performance. First this may sound surprising,
but it is impossible even for humans to predict a person’s age
with such precision. Thus some intervals needed to be defined
for age prediction. Choosing narrow age ranges (1-10 years)
also resulted in poor prediction accuracy. On the other hand,
choosing a too wide age range (25 years and over) would have
resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
trade-off, we divided people into 4 age groups: 1-20, 21-40,
41-60 and 61-80 years.
The results of our experiment are detailed in the following
section.
V. MEASUREMENTS
As seen in Table I, which represents the sex prediction
model’s confusion matrix on the test data, the model achieved
an accuracy score of 91.8%, and an F1 score of 91.8%.
Looking at the confusion matrix it can be concluded that even
such a simple model can correctly recognize with closely the
same accuracy both males and females. Figure 2 shows the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which achieved
an area under curve (AUC) value of 97.6%.
Table II shows the confusion matrix of the age prediction
model’s performance on the test data. It can be seen that the
age prediction model achieved an overall accuracy score of
77% and a weighted F1 score of 76.3%. As expected, this
model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9%
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% were between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that almost half the people in the dataset were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model makes is predicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
model’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
DEMOGRAPHICS
With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
embeddings against a synthetic database. We carried out attack
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Fig. 1. The considered attack when a malicious third party reconstructs demographic data from embeddings and re-identifies data subjects by linking with
another public database.
attacker model (see Figure 1). Smart cameras observe the
company’s various areas and extract the face embedding of
employees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automation, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by stealing or an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
demographic information (age, sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm created for this task (Step 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can get, and how accurately they can predict demographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equivalence class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence class is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using open source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare two embeddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being the
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hyper parameter tuning and can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based learning algorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on randomly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
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and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can get, and how accurately they can predict demographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
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subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using open source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare two embeddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being the
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hyper parameter tuning and can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based learning algorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on randomly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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attacker model (see Figure 1). Smart cameras observe the
company’s various areas and extract the face embedding of
employees appearing in the video footage (Step 1). These em-
beddings are then transferred and stored in a central database
for later use either for tracking, automation, identification
or other purposes (Step 2). The attacker then accesses these
embeddings (Steps 3-4, e.g. en employee by stealing or an
external person via hacking) and infers the data subjects’
demographic information (age, sex and race) from them using
a computer algorithm created for this task (Step 5). With
this new information the attacker may now be able to do a
successful re-identification attack by comparing the original
data with another public data source, for example by looking
up people on a social networking site (Steps 6-7).
The success of such an attack largely depends on Step 4
and Step 5 from Figure 1: how many embeddings the attacker
can get, and how accurately they can predict demographic
information from those embeddings. Thus, it is necessary to
assess the potential attacker strength first. In our work, we
assume a strong attacker who has access to all the embeddings
stored in the database, and our main goal is to discover the
level of prediction accuracy achievable regarding demographic
data.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In order to estimate the potential success of attackers,
on a real life dataset we considered the equivalence class
distribution of demographic details. An equivalence class is a
subset of elements that are equivalent to each other based on
the demographic characteristics that we are trying to predict.
In a database, the more people that are either unique or fall in
small equivalence classes (e.g. at most 5 members), the higher
the risk of re-identification is.
A. Technical Details
We carried out our analysis in the Python programming
language, using open source libraries created for working on
data science and machine learning (ML) applications (NumPy
[29], pandas [30], Scikit-learn [31]). The face recognition
library we used was face recognition [32], which is a wrapper
built around dlib [17] and uses dlib’s state-of-the-art FR
technology based on deep learning to detect faces in images
and/or video frames and extract the face embeddings from
them. While embeddings are hard for a human to interpret,
a computer can compare two embeddings and calculate the
mathematical distance between them, such as Euclidean or
Manhattan distance, with the Euclidean distance being the
most popular ”best practice” choice for face recognition ap-
plications. These metrics can be used to determine whether
the two embeddings belong to the same person or not. The
lower the distance between two embeddings, the more likely
it is that they belong to the same person. Usually, there is a
distance threshold below which we consider embeddings to
belong to the same person.
We used Random Forest Classifiers from the Scikit-learn
library to build three ML models for predicting the age, sex
and race from the embeddings. We chose a Random Forest
Classifier as it is an easy to use ML model that doesn’t require
hyper parameter tuning and can be used easily even by non ML
experts. It is an ensemble-tree based learning algorithm used
to predict the class of test objects. Instead of training a single
decision tree on the entire training data, the random forest
works by training multiple decision trees on randomly sampled
subsets of the training set (while also having the attributes
randomly distributed), and then aggregating the votes of the
decision trees to conclude the final predicted class by majority
voting.
For the data to train and test on, we used UTKFace [33], a
public database containing over 23,000 photos from both sexes
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aged between 1 to over 100, from white, black, asian, indian
and other races, where one image per person is included. Due
to the fact that the various age, sex and race classes were not
balanced, we sampled this data source to gain a more balanced
dataset for training and testing (see the following subsection).
B. Our Methodology
Since the biggest majority of the people in UTKFace
database are under the age of 80 and are either white,
black, asian or indian, we only considered people fitting these
constraints. There was a very low number of examples in
dropped classes which would have led to poor training and
prediction results. However, not all of the remaining classes
were balanced. For example there were 2043 photos of white
males aged between 20 and 40 years, while only 677 Asian
ales in the same age range.
So to achieve a relatively balanced training and testing
data set, we had to apply data down sampling until we were
left with 12192 photos, 1524 photos for each of the 8 race-
sex pairs. Yet, the age distribution still was not completely
balanced, as there were 2893 people (23.73%) aged between
1 and 20 years, 5515 (45.23%) aged between 21 and 40 years,
2452 (20.11%) aged between 41 and 60 years, while only 1332
people (10.93%) were aged between 61 and 80 years. While
we accept this as it is rather life-like, this could hinder model
performance. Furthermore, achieving a completely balanced
dataset would have resulted in too few exa ples to train and
test with.
The following step is to run the face recognition library’s
face encodings function on all the 12192 images, and stor-
ing the face embedding found for each. Since the image
file names contain the necessary information about a per-
son’s demographics (as all the image file names follow the
[age] [gender] [race] [date&time].jpg pattern), the file names
were used to create the training labels for each image.
Equipped with this labeled data set, it is now possible to
use Scikit-learn’s RandomForestClassifier class to train a Ran-
dom Forest Classifier for predicting the age, sex and race
fro face embeddings. In all models, we found that using
a Random Forest of 100 trees can achieve the job (i.e. setting
the n estimators parameter to 100). Also, using Scikit-learn
train test split function to split the data set into 80% training
and 20% testing data made it possible to validate our models.
The simplest Rando Forest Classifier to train was the one
predicting the sex of people based on their face embeddings
as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
age prediction, expecting the prediction of precise age values
resulted in poor performance. First this may sound surprising,
but it is impossible even for humans to predict a person’s age
with such precision. Thus some intervals needed to be defined
for age prediction. Choosing narrow age ranges (1-10 years)
also resulted in poor prediction accuracy. On the other hand,
choosing a too wide age range (25 years and over) would have
resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
trade-off, we divided people into 4 age groups: 1-20, 21-40,
41-60 and 61-80 years.
The results of our experiment are detailed in the following
section.
V. MEASUREMENTS
As seen in Table I, which represents the sex prediction
model’s confusion matrix on the test data, the model achieved
an accuracy score of 91.8%, and an F1 score of 91.8%.
Looking at the confusion matrix it can be concluded that even
such a simple model can correctly recognize with closely the
same accuracy both males and females. Figure 2 shows the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which achieved
an area under curve (AUC) value of 97.6%.
Table II shows the confusion matrix of the age prediction
model’s performance on the test data. It can be seen that the
age prediction model achieved an overall accuracy score of
77% and a weighted F1 score of 76.3%. As expected, this
model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% ere between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that almost half the people in the dataset were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model makes is predicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
odel’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
DEMOGRAPHICS
With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
embeddings against a synthetic database. We carried out attack
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as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
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resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
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model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9%
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% were between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that almost half the people in the dataset were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model makes is predicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
model’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
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With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
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1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04% 0.09%
21-40 0.30% 42.17% 2.26% 0.17%
41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the corresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ever re-use photos
that were part of the training data set. In order to suppress any
potential bias coming from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race from each embedding, and tried to match
the prediction results to people in the original database. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many people’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III





White 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Black 3.03% 21.55% 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17% 22.28% 0.17%
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, then the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
these values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of pe ple falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 pe ple, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulate . If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success f re-i e tificati is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk f re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, t en the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
t ese values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusi n, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attac s by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technol gies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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simulations against databases sizes f 10, 50 and 100 people,
which ar plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companie .
To onstruct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics dat , we relied on c nsus dat from the U iversity
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine L ar ing [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the l tter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 an 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] t extract the correspo ding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ver re-use photos
that were p rt of the training dat set. I order to suppress ny
potential bias comi g from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesize dataset 50 times.
N xt, we used our odels to predict the sex, ag (in 20 year
ranges) and rac from each embedding, and tried to match
the rediction results to people in the riginal atabase. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding o es in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many pe ple’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explai ed in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE RACE PREDICTION MODEL




White 24 46 0 47 13 60
Black 3 03 21 55 0 04 55
Asian 2 0 17 22 2 0 17
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asi n Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider th risks involved with thes
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
cl sses of differ nt sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings reg rding equivalence class
sizes. Th most successful attacks can b carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all recor s
fall i unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerabl privacy risks. Th
risks are present even in the case f the databases of siz
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a uniqu
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% r spectively.
Th re is a considerable risk of re-identification for ma y
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of r -id ntification is
proportional to the equival nce class size. W us d the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we co sider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and th percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is , then the re-
identification risk of that equival nc class is P/k. To get the
expected prop rtion of people re-identified, one has to sum
t s l s for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
t se v lues were 28.90% for the datab se of 10, .38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the dat base of 100 peopl .
I conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using fac embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this p per e discussed otential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespr ad usage f facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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aged between 1 to over 100, from white, black, asian, indian
and other races, where one image per person is included. Due
to the fact that the various age, sex and race classes were not
balanced, we sampled this data source to gain a more balanced
dataset for training and testing (see the following subsection).
B. Our Methodology
Since the biggest majority of the people in UTKFace
database are under the age of 80 and are either white,
black, asian or indian, we only considered people fitting these
constraints. There was a very low number of examples in
dropped classes which would have led to poor training and
prediction results. However, not all of the remaining classes
were balanced. For example there were 2043 photos of white
males aged between 20 and 40 years, while only 677 Asian
males in the same age range.
So to achieve a relatively balanced training and testing
data set, we had to apply data down sampling until we were
left with 12192 photos, 1524 photos for each of the 8 race-
sex pairs. Yet, the age distribution still was not completely
balanced, as there were 2893 people (23.73%) aged between
1 and 20 years, 5515 (45.23%) aged between 21 and 40 years,
2452 (20.11%) aged between 41 and 60 years, while only 1332
people (10.93%) were aged between 61 and 80 years. While
we accept this as it is rather life-like, this could hinder model
performance. Furthermore, achieving a completely balanced
dataset would have resulted in too few examples to train and
test with.
The following step is to run the face recognition library’s
face encodings function on all the 12192 images, and stor-
ing the face embedding found for each. Since the image
file names contain the necessary information about a per-
son’s demographics (as all the image file names follow the
[age] [gender] [race] [date&time].jpg pattern), the file names
were used to create the training labels for each image.
Equipped with this labeled data set, it is now possible to
use Scikit-learn’s RandomForestClassifier class to train a Ran-
dom Forest Classifier for predicting the age, sex and race
from face embeddings. In all models, we found that using
a Random Forest of 100 trees can achieve the job (i.e. setting
the n estimators parameter to 100). Also, using Scikit-learn
train test split function to split the data set into 80% training
and 20% testing data made it possible to validate our models.
The simplest Random Forest Classifier to train was the one
predicting the sex of people based on their face embeddings
as this required only binary classification, while predicting
the age and race required multi-class classification. Regarding
age prediction, expecting the prediction of precise age values
resulted in poor performance. First this may sound surprising,
but it is impossible even for humans to predict a person’s age
with such precision. Thus some intervals needed to be defined
for age prediction. Choosing narrow age ranges (1-10 years)
also resulted in poor prediction accuracy. On the other hand,
choosing a too wide age range (25 years and over) would have
resulted in very poor utility regarding inference. As a viable
trade-off, we divided people into 4 age groups: 1-20, 21-40,
41-60 and 61-80 years.
The results of our experiment are detailed in the following
section.
V. MEASUREMENTS
As seen in Table I, which represents the sex prediction
model’s confusion matrix on the test data, the model achieved
an accuracy score of 91.8%, and an F1 score of 91.8%.
Looking at the confusion matrix it can be concluded that even
such a simple model can correctly recognize with closely the
same accuracy both males and females. Figure 2 shows the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which achieved
an area under curve (AUC) value of 97.6%.
Table II shows the confusion matrix of the age prediction
model’s performance on the test data. It can be seen that the
age prediction model achieved an overall accuracy score of
77% and a weighted F1 score of 76.3%. As expected, this
model’s scores are moderately lower, because predicting a
class that can be anywhere from 1 to 80 is a more complex
problem than predicting sex, which is a simple binary classi-
fication. Also, the confusion matrix itself explains the lower
scores as compared to the sex prediction: as discussed in the
previous chapter, the data set was not completely balanced
through all classes, so the ratio of people aged between 21-
40 years was disproportionately high compared to other age
groups. Summing up the values across the Truth rows, 23.65%
of the people in the test data were aged between 1-20, 44.9%
were between 21-40, 20.49% were between 41-60 and only
10.96% were between 61-80 year old. As a result, the model
is better at predicting younger people’s age, and it fails more
often at predicting older ages. Moreover, possibly due to the
fact that al ost half the people i the datas t were between
21-40 years of age, the model often makes the mistake of
predicting this age group even for 1-21 and 41-60 year age
ranges, too.
Finally, Table III shows the confusion matrix regarding the
race prediction model’s performance on the test data.
The model achieved an accuracy score of 83.4%, and a
weighted F1 score of 88.9%). Based on this, we can conclude
that all the models achieve a considerable accuracy in the
predictions. An interesting pattern to note is that the model
makes more errors with people in the white race: the most
common mistake the model mak s is pr dicting indian, asian
and black people to be white.
Summing up the results we can see that sex prediction works
the best with 91.8% accuracy, better than the race prediction
model’s 83.4% accuracy which outperforms the age prediction
model’s 77% accuracy. While the age prediction model is not
as good as the other two models, it still reaches an accuracy
that can be dangerous from a privacy standpoint. However, the
main takeaway is that the three demographics attributes can
be used to re-identify people from face embeddings.
VI. EMBEDDING RE-IDENTIFICATION BY PREDICTING
DEMOGRAPHICS
With the three Random Forest Classifier models trained, we
were equipped to simulate a re-identification attack using face
embeddings against a synthetic database. We carried out attack
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1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04 0.09%
21-40 0.30% 42.17% 2.26% 0.17%
41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the corresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ever re-use photos
that were part of the training data set. In order to suppress any
potential bias coming from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race from each embedding, and tried to match
the prediction results to people in the original database. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many people’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE RACE PREDICTION MODEL




White 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Black 3.03% 21.55% 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17% 22.28% 0.17%
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, then the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
these values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE SEX PREDICTION MODEL
(ACCURACY=91.8%, REC LL=92.8%, PRECISION=90.9%)
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simulations against databases siz s of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes f r small or medium sized
compani s.
To con truct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphi s dat , we relied on census data from the University
of Californi ’s Adult Data S t for M chine Learni g [34].
This dataset con ains over 30,000 records of diff re t typ s f
people including th ir emographic data (age, sex a d race)
and the rat o of people believed to be repr sented by every
recor . W used the latter weights t sample this datas t to
build the smaller dat bases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each databas , we then associate photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] hat matched their ag , race nd sex,
and used [32] to extract th c rresponding facial embeddings
from these phot s, while taking care ot to ever re-use pho o
that were par of the training d a set. In ord r to suppress any
potential bi s c ming from the r nd m ess, we repeat e ch
experiment with a ew synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to pre ict the sex, age (in 20 year
rang s) and race fro each mbedding, and tri d to mat
the prediction r sults to people in the original database. By
com aring matched records to their c respon ing ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could fi d out
how many people’s demogra hic informatio were correctl
predicted. Als , as explained in S ction IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equival ce class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE RACE PREDICTION MODEL




White 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Black 3 03 21 55 04 55
Asian 2 60 1 22 28 17
Indian 4 1 43 3 18 2
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted R ce
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of p ople falling in equivalenc
classe of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
st ted above, w repeated this proces 50 times for each
maller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence clas
izes. The most successful attacks c n be carried out again t
the mall st database of 10 p opl , wher 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identifie ,
and a dditi nal 33.4% of record fall in an equivalence cla s
of size 2-5, which till means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the ca e of th databases of siz
50 and 100, where the ratio of pe ple falling in a uniqu
equivalence class i 2.36% and 0.98% r s ectively, and t
atio of peopl falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
Ther is a consid rable risk of re-identification for many
peopl in all three database sizes simul ted. If someo e
was unique, then we considered that as a succe sful re-
identification. For th rest, the succ ss of re-identification is
r ortio al to e quivalenc class size. W us d the foll w-
ing metric to determine th ov all risk of r -id ntification in
each dat base size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the perce tage of p opl that fall in that
equivalen e class bas d on th prediction is P, then he re-
identific tion ri k of that equivalence class is /k. To get th
expec ed proportion of people r -id ntified, one h s to sum
these valu s f all equivalence classes. In our experim nts,
t l were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
t dat base of 50, and 6.04% for th d tabase of 0 people.
In conclusi n, th se results show th t carrying out r -
id tification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although s there are mor people in the databas ,
success of the attack d grades, chances of re-ident fication are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associ ted ith the wides read usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular th risks ass ciated with pro
cessing the concerne biom tric id tifiers. More specifically,
we focu ed on attack t at aim to -identify facial emb ddings
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41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the corresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ever re-use photos
that were part of the training data set. In order to suppress any
potential bias coming from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race from each embedding, and tried to match
the prediction results to people in the original database. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many people’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III





Wh te 2 46 7 13 0 60
Black 3.03% 21.55% 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17% 22.28% 0.17%
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, then the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
these values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04% 0.09%
21-40 0.30% 42.17% 2.26% 0.17%
41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the corresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ever re-use photos
that were part of the training data set. In order to suppress any
potential bias coming from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race from each embedding, and tried to match
the prediction results to people in the original database. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many people’s dem graphic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explai ed in S ction IV, th smaller th
size of a person’s equ valence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III





W ite 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Bl ck 3.03% 21.55% 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17% 22.28% 0.17%
Indi n 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, then the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
these values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
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TABLE I
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE SEX PREDICTION MODEL
(AC RACY=91.8%, RECALL=92.8%, P ECISI N=90.9%)
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ut










1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04% 0.09%
21-40 0.30% 42.17% 2.26% 0.17%
41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 1-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible databa e sizes for s all or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people in luding their demographic data (ag , sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by very
record. We used th latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databas s of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each t , we then associated phot s from the
UTKFace dat set [33] that matched th ir age, race and sex,
and use [32] to extrac the orresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, whil taking care ot to ever re-use photos
that w re part of t e train d ta set. In order to uppress any
pot ntial bias coming fro the randomness, we rep ated each
xperiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, e used our model to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race fr m each embedding, and tr ed to match
the pre iction results to p opl in the original database. By
co paring matched rec rds to ir corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
h w m ny peopl ’s d mographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher thei risk of
TABLE III





White 24.46% 0. 7% 0.13% 0.60%
Black 3.03% 21.55% 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17% 22.28% 0.17%
I dian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people fal ing in equival nce
cla ses of differen sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
tated above, we r peated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 sh ws our findings rega ding equivalence class
sizes. The most s ccessful attacks ca b carried out against
the smallest databa e of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique quivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and n additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means consider bl privacy risks. The
r sks are present even i the case of the databa e of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a consid rabl risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, th n we considered that as a successful re-
ide tification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to t e equivalence la size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine th overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and th percentage of pe ple that fal in that
equival nce class bas d on the prediction is P, the e re-
identification risk of that equivalence cla s is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of peop re-identified, one has to sum
these values f r all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 pe ple.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification a tacks by u ing face embedd s is indeed
possible. Although as there are more p ople in the database,
uccess of the attack degr des, chanc s of re-identification are
n ver negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion te hnologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biome ric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that a m to re-identify facial embeddings
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TABLE I
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE SEX PREDICTION MODEL
(A CURACY=91.8%, RECALL=92.8%, PREC SION=90.9%)
Tr
ut
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1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04 0.09%
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Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 peo le,
whic are plausible database sizes f r small or medium sized
compani s.
To c n truct the synthe ic databases with realistic demo-
graphi s data, we r lied on census data from the University
of Californi ’s Adult Data S t for M chine Learni g [34].
This dataset contains over 30,0 0 records of diff re t types of
peo le including their demographic data ( ge, sex and race)
and the ratio of peo le b lieved to be r p sent d by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller dat bases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person i each database, we then associate photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] tha matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the correspondi g faci l embeddings
from these phot s, while taking care ot t ever r -use photo
tha were part of the training data set. In ord to suppress any
poten ial bi s coming from the r ndom ess, we repeated ch
experiment with a ew synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to pre ict the sex, age (in 20 year
rang s) and race fro each embedding, and tri d to match
the prediction r sults to peo le in the original database. By
com aring matched records to heir c respon i g ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could fi d out
how many peo le’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Als , as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivale c lass i , the ig er their r sk of
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE RACE PREDICTION MODEL




White 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Black 3 03 21 55 04 55
Asian 2 60 0 17 22 28 17
Indian 4 1 43 0 3 18 52
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted R ce
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So t c nsider the risks invol ed with t ese
attacks, we measured the rat o of p o le falling in equivalenc
classe of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
st ted above, w r peat d this process 50 times for each
maller database to get an veraged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findi gs regarding equivalenc lass
sizes. The most successful attacks c n be carried out again t
the mall st da abase of 10 peo le, wher 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalenc lass and are thus re-identifie ,
and a dditional 33.4% of record fall in a equivalenc lass
of size 2-5, whic still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even i the case of th databases of siz
50 and 100, where t e ra io of pe le falling in a uniqu
equivalenc lass is 2.36% and 0.98% resp ctively, and th
ratio of peo le falling in a equivalenc lass of size 2-5 is
12.7 % and 7.18% resp ctively.
There is a consid rable risk of re-identification for many
peo l in all three database sizes simulated. If someo e
was unique, then we considered tha s a succe sful re-
identification. For the r st, the success of re-identification is
pro orti nal to the equivalenc lass size. W us d the follow-
ing metric to determine th overall risk of r -id ntification i
each database ize. If we consider the size of an equivalenc
class to be k, and the perc tage of peo le tha fall in tha
equivalence lass bas d on the prediction is P, then the r -
identification ri k of tha equivalenc lass is /k. To get the
exp ct d pro orti n f peo le r -id ntified, one has to sum
these values f all equivalenc lasse . In our exp riments,
were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
dat base of 50, and 6.04% for the d tabase of 0 peo le.
In conclusion, these r sults show th carrying out r -
ide tification attacks by using face embeddings i ndee
possible. Although as there are mor p o le in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discu sed poten ial privacy and security
risks a soci ted ith t e wides read usage of faci l recogni-
t on technologies, in particular th risks a s ciated with pro
cessing the concern d biometric identifiers. More specifi ally,
we focused on attack tha aim to re-identify faci l embeddings
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Fig. 3. The ratio of equivalence classes (EC) in the predicted databases (D)
for various database sizes. Values in parentheses show the expected proportion
of re-identified users.
based on using face embeddings to find out three key pieces
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. We
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embeddings.
B sed on our finding , it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 ear range) and race
from a face embedd ng w th high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
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based on using face embeddings to find out three key pieces
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. We
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embeddings.
Based on our findings, it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
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Based on our findings, it is ind ed possible to correctly
predict someon ’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
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accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research has been supported by the European Union,
co-financed by the European Social Fund (EFOP-3.6.2-16-
2017-00013, Thematic Fundamental Research Collaborations
Grounding Innovation in Informatics and Infocommunica-
tions).
Project no. FIEK 16-1-2016-0007 has been implemented
with the support provided from the National Research, De-
velopment and Innovation Fund of Hungary, financed under
the Centre for Higher Education and Industrial Cooperation
- Research infrastructure development (FIEK 16) funding
scheme.
Icons made by Pixel perfect, fjstudio, Freepik, Pause08,
surang, S ashicons from www.flaticon.com.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Introna and H. Nissenbaum, “Facial recognition technology: a survey
of policy and implementation issues,” 2010.
[2] C. Castelluccia and D. Le Me´tayer Inria, “Impact analysis of facial
recognition,” Feb. 2020, working paper or preprint.
[3] “Facial recognition: for a debate living up to the challenges,” 2019.
4 J. Goldenfein, “Facial ecognition is only the beginning,” 2020.
5 E. . E. D. P. Board, “Guidelines 3/2019 on processi g of personal data
through video devices,” 2019.
[6] T. Macaulay, “Automated facial recognition breaches gdpr, says eu
digital chief,” 2020.
[7] S. Stolton, “Leak: Commission considers facial recognition ban in ai
‘white paper’,” 2020.
[8] E. Commission, “White paper on artificial intelligence: a european
approach to excellence and trust,” Tech. Rep., 02 2020.
[9] T. Macaulay, “Washingto state pass s microsoft-approved facial recog-
nition l ws,” 2020.
[10] D. Lee, “San francisco is first us city to ban facial recognition,” 2019.
1 FRA, “Facial recognition technology: fund mental rights considerations
in the context of law enforcement,” 2019.
[12] M. Kaya and H. Bilge, “Deep metric learning: A survey,”
Symmetry, vol. 11, p. 1066, 08 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.d i.org/ 0.3390/sym11091066
[13] G. Mai, K. Cao, P. C Yuen, and A. K. Jain, “On the reconstruction
of face images from deep face templates,” p. 1188–1202, May 2019.
[Onlin ]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.20 8. 827389
[14] M. Gomez-Barrero and J. Galbally, “Reversing the irreversible: A survey
on inverse biometrics,” Computers & Security, vol. 90, p. 101700,
2020. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2 19.101700
[15] L. Sirovich and M. Kirby, “L w-dimensional procedure for the
characterization of human faces,” Josa a, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 519–524,
1987. [Online]. Available: https://www.doi.org/10.1364/josaa.4.000 19
[16] M. Turk a d A. Pentland, “Eigenfaces f recognition,” Journal of
cognitive neuroscience, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 71–86, 1991.
[17] D. E. King, “Dlib-ml: A machi e learning toolkit,” Journal of Machine
Learning Research, vol. 10, pp. 1755–1758, 2009.
[18] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Proc edings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern e ognition, 2016, pp. 770–778. [Online]. Availabl :
https://www.doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2016.90
[19] G. B. Huang, M. Ramesh, T. Berg, and E. Learned-Miller, “Labeled
faces in the wild: A database for studying fac ecognition in uncon-
strained environments,” University of Mass hus tts, Amherst, Tech.
Rep. 07-49, Octob r 2007.
[20] F. Schroff, D. Kalenichenko, and J. Philbin, “Facenet: A unified
embedding for face recogniti n and clustering,” 2015 IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recog ition (CVPR), Ju 2015.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2015.7298682
[21] K. Q. Weinberger, J. Blitzer, and L. K. Saul, “Distance metric learning
for large margin nearest neighbor classification,” i In NIPS. MIT
Press, 2006.
[22] E. Parliament and of the Council, “Regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the
european parliament and of the council of 27 april 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
n the free movement of such data, and repealing directive 95/46/ec
(general data protection regulation),” 2016.
[23] E. . E. P. R. Service, “Understanding algorithmic decision-making:
Opportunities and challenges,” 2019.
[24] X. Dong, K. Wong, Z. Jin, and J.-L. Dugelay, “A cancellable
face template scheme based on nonlinear multi-dimension spectral
hashing,” Cancun, MEXICO, 05 2019. [Onlin ]. Available:
ttps://www.doi.org/10.1109/iwbf.2019.8739179
[25] L. Sweeney, “Simple demographics often identify people uniquely,”
2000, Working paper.
[26] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large
sparse datasets,” in Proc. of the 29th IEEE Symposiu on Security and
Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, May 2008, pp. 111–125. [Online].
Available: https://www.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.33
[27] . N rayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing social networks,”
in 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Securit and Privacy, 2009, pp.
173–187. [Online]. Available: https://doi.o g/10.1109/sp.2009. 2
[28] Y.-A. de Montjoye, L. Radaelli, V. K. Singh, and A. “. Pentland,
“Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card
metadata,” Sci nce, vol. 347, no. 6221, pp. 536–539, 2015. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1256297
INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. Y, APRIL 2020 6
Fig. 3. The ratio of equivalence classes (EC) in the predicted databases (D)
for various database sizes. Values in parentheses show the expected proportion
of re-identified users.
b sed on using face mb ddings to find ou three key pieces
of emographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal wa to exami e the level of accuracy achievable in
pr icting the sex, ge and race from face mbedding. W
used a publicly available facial d tabase l beled with these
emographic attribut s to buil a labeled training and testing
data t, nd we t ined a Rando Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embed ings.
Based on our findings, it is deed possible to correctly
predict som one’s sex, age (wit in a 20 ye r range) and race
from a f ce embedding with high accuracies: our models
hieved a 90.9% ac uracy s ore on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score race prediction and a 77% accuracy sc e
on age predic ion. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and ocessing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identificatio attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
A the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up w th privacy pres rving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face mbeddings in
uch a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
ame person should rema n close to each other in the vector
space after th modification) while prot cting th m against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research has been supported by the European Union,
co-financed by the European Social Fund (EFOP-3.6.2-16-
2017-00013, Thematic Fundament l Research Collaborations
Grounding Innovation in Informatics and Infocommunica-
tions).
Project no. FIEK 16-1-2016-0007 h s been implemented
with th support provided from the National Research, D -
velopment and Innovation Fund of Hu gary, financed under
the C ntre for Higher Education and Industrial Cooperat on
- Res arch infrastructure development (FIEK 16) funding
scheme.
Icons de by Pixel perfect, fjstudio, Freepik, Pause08,
surang, Smashicons from www.flaticon.com.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Introna and H. Nissenbaum, “Facial recognition technology: a survey
of policy and implementation issues,” 2010.
[2] C. Castelluccia and D. Le Me´tayer Inria, “Impact analysis of facial
recognition,” Feb. 2020, working paper or preprint.
[3] “Facial recognition: for a debate living up to the challenges,” 2019.
[4] J. Goldenfein, “Facial recognition is only the beginning,” 2020.
[5] E. . E. D. P. Board, “Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data
through video devices,” 2019.
[6] T. Macaulay, “Automated facial recognition breaches gdpr, says eu
digital chief,” 2020.
[7] S. Stolton, “Leak: Commission considers facial recognition ban in ai
‘white paper’,” 2020.
[8] E. Commission, “White paper on artificial intelligence: a european
approach to excellence and trust,” Tech. Rep., 02 2020.
[9] T. Macaulay, “Washington state passes microsoft-approved facial recog-
nition laws,” 2020.
[10] D. Lee, “San francisco is first us city to ban facial recognition,” 2019.
[11] FRA, “Facial recognition technology: fundamental rights considerations
in the context of law enforcement,” 2019.
[12] M. Kaya and H. Bilge, “Deep metric learning: A survey,”
Symmetry, vol. 11, p. 1066, 08 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.doi.org/10.3390/sym11091066
[13] G. Mai, K. Cao, P. C. Yuen, and A. K. Jain, “On the reconstruction
of face images from deep face templates,” p. 1188–1202, May 2019.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2018.2827389
[14] M. Gomez-Barrero and J. Galbally, “Reversing the irreversible: A survey
on inverse biometrics,” Computers & Security, vol. 90, p. 101700,
2020. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101700
[15] L. Sirovich and M. Kirby, “Low-dimensional procedure for the
characterization of human faces,” Josa a, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 519–524,
1987. [Online]. Available: https://www.doi.org/10.1364/josaa.4.000519
[16] M. Turk and A. Pentland, “Eigenfaces for recognition,” Journal of
cognitive neuroscience, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 71–86, 1991.
[17] D. E. King, “Dlib-ml: A machine learning toolkit,” Journal of Machine
Learning Research, vol. 10, pp. 1755–1758, 2009.
[18] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition, 2016, pp. 770–778. [Online]. Available:
https://www.doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2016.90
[19] G. B. Huang, M. Ramesh, T. Berg, and E. Learned-Miller, “Labeled
faces in the wild: A database for studying face recognition in uncon-
strained environments,” University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Tech.
Rep. 07-49, October 2007.
[20] F. Schroff, D. Kalenichenko, and J. Philbin, “Facenet: A unified
embedding for face recognition and clustering,” 2015 IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Jun 2015.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2015.7298682
[21] K. Q. Weinberger, J. Blitzer, and L. K. Saul, “Distance metric learning
for large margin nearest neighbor classification,” in In NIPS. MIT
Press, 2006.
[22] E. Parliament and of the Council, “Regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the
european parliament and of the council of 27 april 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing directive 95/46/ec
(general data protection regulation),” 2016.
[23] E. . E. P. R. Service, “Understanding algorithmic decision-making:
Opportunities and challenges,” 2019.
[24] X. Dong, K. Wong, Z. Jin, and J.-L. Dugelay, “A cancellable
face template scheme based on nonlinear multi-dimension spectral
hashing,” Cancun, MEXICO, 05 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.doi.org/10.1109/iwbf.2019.8739179
[25] L. Sweeney, “Simple demographics often identify people uniquely,”
2000, Working paper.
[26] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large
sparse datasets,” in Proc. of the 29th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, May 2008, pp. 111–125. [Online].
Available: https://www.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.33
[27] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing social networks,”
in 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2009, pp.
173–187. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2009.22
[28] Y.-A. de Montjoye, L. Radaelli, V. K. Singh, and A. “. Pentland,
“Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card
metadata,” Science, vol. 347, no. 6221, pp. 536–539, 2015. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1256297
INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. Y, APRIL 2020 6
Fig. 3. The ratio of equivalence classes (EC) in the predicted databases (D)
for various database sizes. Values in parentheses show the expected proportion
of re-identified users.
based on using face embeddings to find out three key pieces
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. We
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embeddings.
Based on our findings, it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
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TABLE I














1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04% 0.09%
21-40 0.30% 42.17% 2.26% 0.17%
41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the corresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ever re-use photos
that were part of the training data set. In order to suppress any
potential bias coming from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race from each embedding, and tried to match
the prediction results to people in the original database. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many people’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III





White 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Black 3.03% 21.55% 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17% 22.28% 0.17%
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, then the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
these values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of pe ple falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 pe ple, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulate . If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success f re-i e tificati is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk f re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, t en the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
t ese values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusi n, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attac s by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technol gies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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TABLE I
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE SEX PREDICTION MODEL
(A CURACY=91.8%, RECALL=92.8%, PREC SION=90.9%)
Tr
ut










1-20 17 63 5 89 0 04 09
2 4 30 42 17 2 26 0 17
4 6 6 96 11 44 2 05
61-80 0. 4% .02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes f 10, 50 and 100 people,
which ar plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companie .
To onstruct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics dat , we relied on c nsus dat from the U iversity
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine L ar ing [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the l tter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 an 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] t extract the correspo ding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ver re-use photos
that were p rt of the training dat set. I order to suppress ny
potential bias comi g from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesize dataset 50 times.
N xt, we used our odels to predict the sex, ag (in 20 year
ranges) and rac from each embedding, and tried to match
the rediction results to people in the riginal atabase. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding o es in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many pe ple’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explai ed in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE RACE PREDICTION MODEL




White 24 46 0 47 13 60
Black 3 03 21 55 0 04 55
Asian 2 0 17 22 2 0 17
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asi n Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider th risks involved with thes
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
cl sses of differ nt sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings reg rding equivalence class
sizes. Th most successful attacks can b carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all recor s
fall i unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerabl privacy risks. Th
risks are present even in the case f the databases of siz
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a uniqu
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% r spectively.
Th re is a considerable risk of re-identification for ma y
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of r -id ntification is
proportional to the equival nce class size. W us d the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we co sider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and th percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is , then the re-
identification risk of that equival nc class is P/k. To get the
expected prop rtion of people re-identified, one has to sum
t s l s for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
t se v lues were 28.90% for the datab se of 10, .38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the dat base of 100 peopl .
I conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using fac embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this p per e discussed otential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespr ad usage f facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. Y, APRIL 2020 5
TABLE I














1-20 17.63% 5.89% 0.04% 0.09%
21-40 0.30% 42.17% 2.26% 0.17%
41-60 0.04% 6.96% 11.44% 2.05%
61-80 0.04% 1.02% 4.18% 5.72%
1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80
Predicted Age
simulations against databases sizes of 10, 50 and 100 people,
which are plausible database sizes for small or medium sized
companies.
To construct the synthetic databases with realistic demo-
graphics data, we relied on census data from the University
of California’s Adult Data Set for Machine Learning [34].
This dataset contains over 30,000 records of different types of
people including their demographic data (age, sex and race)
and the ratio of people believed to be represented by every
record. We used the latter weights to sample this dataset to
build the smaller databases of 10, 50 and 100. For every
person in each database, we then associated photos from the
UTKFace dataset [33] that matched their age, race and sex,
and used [32] to extract the corresponding facial embeddings
from these photos, while taking care not to ever re-use photos
that were part of the training data set. In order to suppress any
potential bias coming from the randomness, we repeated each
experiment with a new synthesized dataset 50 times.
Next, we used our models to predict the sex, age (in 20 year
ranges) and race from each embedding, and tried to match
the prediction results to people in the original database. By
comparing matched records to their corresponding ones in
the original database (the ground truth), we could find out
how many people’s demographic information were correctly
predicted. Also, as explained in Section IV, the smaller the
size of a person’s equivalence class is, the higher their risk of
TABLE III





White 24.46% 0.47% 0.13% 0.60%
Bla k 3.03% 21.55 0.04% 0.55%
Asian 2.60% 0.17 22.28% 0.17%
Indian 4.61% 0.43% 0.38% 18.52%
White Black Asian Indian
Predicted Race
Fig. 2. The ROC curve for the sex prediction model (AUC=97.6%)
re-identification. So to consider the risks involved with these
attacks, we measured the ratio of people falling in equivalence
classes of different sizes (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 20+). As
stated above, we repeated this process 50 times for each
smaller database to get an averaged out result.
Figure 3 shows our findings regarding equivalence class
sizes. The most successful attacks can be carried out against
the smallest database of 10 people, where 16% of all records
fall in a unique equivalence class and are thus re-identified,
and an additional 33.4% of records fall in an equivalence class
of size 2-5, which still means considerable privacy risks. The
risks are present even in the case of the databases of size
50 and 100, where the ratio of people falling in a unique
equivalence class is 2.36% and 0.98% respectively, and the
ratio of people falling in an equivalence class of size 2-5 is
12.72% and 7.18% respectively.
There is a considerable risk of re-identification for many
people in all three database sizes simulated. If someone
was unique, then we considered that as a successful re-
identification. For the rest, the success of re-identification is
proportional to the equivalence class size. We used the follow-
ing metric to determine the overall risk of re-identification in
each database size. If we consider the size of an equivalence
class to be k, and the percentage of people that fall in that
equivalence class based on the prediction is P, then the re-
identification risk of that equivalence class is P/k. To get the
expected proportion of people re-identified, one has to sum
these values for all equivalence classes. In our experiments,
these values were 28.90% for the database of 10, 10.38% for
the database of 50, and 6.04% for the database of 100 people.
In conclusion, these results show that carrying out re-
identification attacks by using face embeddings is indeed
possible. Although as there are more people in the database,
success of the attack degrades, chances of re-identification are
never negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed potential privacy and security
risks associated with the widespread usage of facial recogni-
tion technologies, in particular the risks associated with pro-
cessing the concerned biometric identifiers. More specifically,
we focused on attack that aim to re-identify facial embeddings
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Fig. 3. The ratio of equivalence classes (EC) in the predicted databases (D)
for various database sizes. Values in parentheses show the expected proportion
of re-identified users.
based on using face embeddings to find out three key pieces
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. We
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embeddings.
Based on our findings, it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
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based on usi g face embeddings to find out three key piece
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. We
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embeddings.
Based on our findings, it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research has been supported by the European Union,
co-financed by the European Social Fund (EFOP-3.6.2-16-
2017-00013, Thematic Fundamental Research Collaborations
Grounding Innovation in Informatics and Infocommunica-
tions).
Project no. FIEK 16-1-2016-0007 has been implemented
with the support provided from the National Research, De-
velopment and Innovation Fund of Hungary, financed under
the Centre for Higher Education and Industrial Cooperation
- Research infrastructure development (FIEK 16) funding
scheme.
Icons made by Pixel perfect, fjstudio, Freepik, Pause08,
surang, Smashicons from www.flaticon.com.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Introna and H. Nissenbaum, “Facial recognition technology: a survey
of policy and implementation issues,” 2010.
[2] C. Castelluccia and D. Le Me´tayer Inria, “Impact analysis of facial
recognition,” Feb. 2020, working paper or preprint.
[3] “Facial recognition: for a debate living up to the challenges,” 2019.
[4] J. Goldenfein, “Facial recognition is only the beginning,” 2020.
[5] E. . E. D. P. Board, “Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data
through video devices,” 2019.
[6] T. Macaulay, “Automated facial recognition breaches gdpr, says eu
digital chief,” 2020.
[7] S. Stolton, “Leak: Commission considers facial recognition ban in ai
‘white paper’,” 2020.
[8] E. Commission, “White paper on artificial intelligence: a european
approach to excellence and trust,” Tech. Rep., 02 2020.
[9] T. Macaulay, “Washington state passes microsoft-approved facial recog-
nition laws,” 2020.
[10] D. Lee, “San francisco is first us city to ban facial recognition,” 2019.
[11] FRA, “Facial recognition technology: fundamental rights considerations
in the context of law enforcement,” 2019.
[12] M. Kaya and H. Bilge, “Deep metric learning: A survey,”
Symmetry, vol. 11, p. 1066, 08 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.doi.org/10.3390/sym11091066
[13] G. Mai, K. Cao, P. C. Yuen, and A. K. Jain, “On the reconstruction
of face images from deep face templates,” p. 1188–1202, May 2019.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2018.2827389
[14] M. Gomez-Barrero and J. Galbally, “Reversing the irreversible: A survey
on inverse biometrics,” Computers & Security, vol. 90, p. 101700,
2020. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101700
[15] L. Sirovich and M. Kirby, “Low-dimensional procedure for the
characterization of human faces,” Josa a, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 519–524,
1987. [Online]. Available: https://www.doi.org/10.1364/josaa.4.000519
[16] M. Turk and A. Pentland, “Eigenfaces for recognition,” Journal of
cognitive neuroscience, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 71–86, 1991.
[17] D. E. King, “Dlib-ml: A machine learning toolkit,” Journal of Machine
Learning Research, vol. 10, pp. 1755–1758, 2009.
[18] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition, 2016, pp. 770–778. [Online]. Available:
https://www.doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2016.90
[19] G. B. Huang, M. Ramesh, T. Berg, and E. Learned-Miller, “Labeled
faces in the wild: A database for studying face recognition in uncon-
strained environments,” University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Tech.
Rep. 07-49, October 2007.
[20] F. Schroff, D. Kalenichenko, and J. Philbin, “Facenet: A unified
embedding for face recognition and clustering,” 2015 IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Jun 2015.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2015.7298682
[21] K. Q. Weinberger, J. Blitzer, and L. K. Saul, “Distance metric learning
for large margin nearest neighbor classification,” in In NIPS. MIT
Press, 2006.
[22] E. Parliament and of the Council, “Regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the
european parliament and of the council of 27 april 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing directive 95/46/ec
(general data protection regulation),” 2016.
[23] E. . E. P. R. Service, “Understanding algorithmic decision-making:
Opportunities and challenges,” 2019.
[24] X. Dong, K. Wong, Z. Jin, and J.-L. Dugelay, “A cancellable
face template scheme based on nonlinear multi-dimension spectral
hashing,” Cancun, MEXICO, 05 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.doi.org/10.1109/iwbf.2019.8739179
[25] L. Sweeney, “Simple demographics often identify people uniquely,”
2000, Working paper.
[26] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large
sparse datasets,” in Proc. of the 29th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, May 2008, pp. 111–125. [Online].
Available: https://www.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.33
[27] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing social networks,”
in 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2009, pp.
173–187. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2009.22
[28] Y.-A. de Montjoye, L. Radaelli, V. K. Singh, and A. “. Pentland,
“Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card
metadata,” Science, vol. 347, no. 6221, pp. 536–539, 2015. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1256297
INFOCOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL, VOL. X, NO. Y, APRIL 2020 6
Fig. 3. The ratio of equivalence classes (EC) in the predicted databases (D)
for various database sizes. Values in parentheses show the expected proportion
of re-identified users.
based on using face embeddings to find out three key pieces
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. e
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the e beddings.
Based on our findings, it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
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based on using face embeddings to find out three key pieces
of demographics data about the data subjects.
Our goal was to examine the level of accuracy achievable in
predicting the sex, age and race from a face embedding. We
used a publicly available facial database labeled with these
demographic attributes to build a labeled training and testing
dataset, and we trained a Random Forest Classifier to predict
the sex, age and race from the embeddings.
Based on our findings, it is indeed possible to correctly
predict someone’s sex, age (within a 20 year range) and race
from a face embedding with high accuracies: our models
achieved a 90.9% accuracy score on sex prediction, a 83.4%
accuracy score on race prediction and a 77% accuracy score
on age prediction. As a result, we can consider our theory
proven and state that the storing and processing of unprotected
face embeddings pose considerable privacy risks as far as re-
identification attacks and sensitive data leakage are concerned.
As the final conclusion, we state that further research is
necessary to come up with privacy preserving ways to protect
embeddings. One idea is to modify the face embeddings in
such a way as to keep their utility (e.g. embeddings of the
same person should remain close to each other in the vector
space after the modification) while protecting them against
reverse engineering attacks to make inference more difficult.
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Adapting IT Algorithms and Protocols to an
Intelligent Urban Traffic Control
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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles, communicating with each
other and with the urban infrastructure as well, open opportunity
to introduce new, complex and effective behaviours to the
intelligent traffic systems. Such systems can be perceived quite
naturally as hierarchically built intelligent multi-agent systems,
with the decision making based upon well-defined and profoundly
tested mathematical algorithms, borrowed e.g. from the field of
information technology.
In this article, two examples of how to adapt such algorithms
to the intelligent urban traffic are presented. Since the optimal
and fair timing of the traffic lights is crucial in the traffic
control, we show how a simple Round-Robin scheduler and
Minimal Destination Distance First scheduling (adaptation of
the theoretically optimal Shortest Job First scheduler) were
implemented and tested for traffic light control. Another example
is the mitigation of the congested traffic using the analogy of the
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) protocol of the computer
networks. We show that the optimal scheduling based traffic light
control can handle roughly the same complexity of the traffic as
the traditional light programs in the nominal case. However,
in extraordinary and especially fastly evolving situations, the
intelligent solutions can clearly outperform the traditional ones.
The ECN based method can successfully limit the traffic flowing
through bounded areas. That way the number of passing-through
vehicles in e.g. residential areas may be reduced, making them
more comfortable congestion-free zones in a city.
Index Terms—intelligent traffic control, connected vehicles,
congestion notification, Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS),
Intelligent Traffic Light System (ITLS)
I. INTRODUCTION
AS our vehicles become more and more sophisticated (upto being self-driving and autonomous, smart cars for
convenience) and the traffic infrastructure itself also evolves,
communication between smart cars (V2V), or between smart
cars and various parts of the infrastructure (V2I), or even
between various elements of the infrastructure (intersections,
parking lots, etc.) is no longer a fiction. If the infrastructure
and the smart cars are also capable of cooperative actions
by following the exchanged communication messages, it is
possible to form intelligent multi-agent systems to improve
road safety, reduce traveling times, costs and pollution, or
even to mitigate congestion as well. For more details, see
Section III.
However, the internal behavior (the decision making) of
these agents has to be defined. Among others such agents have
The research has been supported in part by the BME – Artificial Intelligence
FIKP grant of EMMI (BME FIKP-MI/SC) and in part by the European
Union, co-financed by the European Social Fund (EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00013,
Thematic Fundamental Research Collaborations Grounding Innovation in
Informatics and Infocommunications).
to calculate answers to the e.g. following questions: Would
it be beneficial for a smart car to join a group of cars in
front of it? When should an intelligent traffic light provide a
green-light for a particular platoon of smart cars? When shall
an intelligent traffic light ask one of its neighbor junctions
to reduce its output to prevent congestion? To be able to
answer these questions, Round-Robin, Minimal Destination
Distance First, and Explicit Congestion Notification protocols
are proposed in Section IV. When we defined these methods,
we had the presumption that every vehicle in the traffic are
autonomous and can communicate with each other.
Besides integrating various components of an intelligent
transportation system into a hierarchical multi-agent system,
adopting the aforementioned protocols to the road traffic
domain, especially the ECN protocol, is the principal novelty
in our research. The proposed solutions were also tested by
simulations of different (hopefully realistic) scenarios, using
the Eclipse SUMO microscopic traffic simulator tool [1]. The
measurements and their results are summarized in Section V.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
As the first coordinated traffic lights were created more than
one hundred years ago [2], the literature of traffic control
contains many interesting articles, books, and lecture-notes.
Even though this is a well-researched area, perhaps the major
problem of transportation, the congestion, still exists.
Traffic signal coordination, green-waves, are nowadays
mainly created by methods depending on analyzing statistical
data, like TRANSYT and SCOOT [3]. Since those algorithms
were created decades ago, they might not be able to handle
the problems of today’s traffic. Thus, it may be helpful to
implement new, intelligent methods into the traffic lights. One
of these approaches may be the usage of Minimal Destination
Distance First [4] control which is analogous to the theoret-
ically optimal scheduling algorithm, called the shortest job
first. Unfortunately, this method is unfair on its own, therefore
it shall be modified to use it in real-life [5].
It is natural to treat the participants of urban traffic (e.g.
vehicles, infrastructural elements, traffic lights, etc.) as a multi-
agent system. In this framework, novel ideas can also be
experimented with, such as a time-slot booking to pass through
at the intersections, explained in [6]. Unfortunately, there is
no guarantee that a smart vehicle will arrive on-time to a
certain intersection, but this method contains the possibility to
withdraw the already posted bookings. The problem is that the
state-space of such a system can be enormous, therefore this
